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INTRODUCTION 
On March 11, 1992, this Court issued its opinion on the 
transcript issue in State v. Menzies, Case No. 880161 (Utah 
March 11, 1992). A copy of the slip opinion is contained in 
Addendum A. The opinion can also be found at State v. Menzies, 182 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1992). 
This petition is filed pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. See generally Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 512 
(Utah 1886); Cumminas v. Nielsen, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In reaching the decision that one of the transcripts 
prepared in the instant case was adequate for mandatory appellate 
review of this capital homicide case, the Menzies opinion focuses 
only on evidence which supports the conclusion, disregarding adverse 
evidence. 
The presumption of correctness does not apply to the 
transcript since (1) even if Ms. Lee were a "de facto reporter/1 
such status would allow her to act as court reporter but would not 
give rise to a determination that a transcript prepared by her was 
"prima facie correct," (2) the clear weight of the evidence 
establishes that Ms. Lee was not a temporary reporter, and (3) the 
"certifications" of the original transcript were proved false. 
The Menzies opinion inappropriately relies on the docketing 
statement to define the issues in this case. The purpose of a 
docketing statement is not to limit issues, especially in a capital 
homicide case. Given the length of this trial, the complexity of 
this case, and the fact that a transcript was not available when the 
docketing statement was filed, Mr. Menzies respectfully requests 
that this Court reconsider reliance on the docketing statement in 
minimizing the issues in this case. 
The numerous significant acknowledged transcription errors 
establish that the transcript is not adequate for appellate review. 
The opinion inappropriately assumes at times that Ms. Lee took down 
everything that was said, while acknowledging at other times that 
gaps occur. The opinion also gives mixed messages about the role of 
plain error in capital cases. For example, this Court relies at 
times on defense counsel's lack of objection or challenge as 
establishing that no error occurred. Other specific concerns 
regarding the resolution of various errors in the transcript are set 
forth below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE FACT STATEMENT MISSTATES THE FACTS 
AND MAKES FACTUAL FINDINGS WHICH WERE NOT MADE BY 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
In setting forth the facts regarding the transcript and 
analyzing those facts throughout the opinion, the opinion sifts 
through all of the evidence presented in the new trial proceedings 
and focuses only on the evidence which supports the determination 
that the transcript is adequate. The opinion disregards significant 
evidence including but not limited to (1) evidence regarding 
Ms. Lee's licensing problems in California and her suspension from 
practice in that state (see Addendum I to Appellant's opening 
brief), (2) difficulties with Ms. Lee's 
- 2 -
employment in Third District Court and her ultimate termination 
(R. 1166:75, 77, 79; D.E. 14, 15, 16), (3) oversights in Ms. Lee's 
hiring at Third District Court, including the failure to check 
references, and dishonesty by Ms. Lee in the application process 
(R. 1166:32), (4) the testimony of two court reporters who 
established that Ms. Lee was unable to adequately record and 
transcribe proceedings and who each held the opinion that Ms. Lee 
was not capable of transcribing a capital homicide case 
(R. 1185:15-16, 17, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53). 
The opinion states that Ms. Lee worked in the California 
courts from August 1985 through July 1987 and that Ms. Lee stopped 
paying her California dues when she moved to Utah because she did 
not believe that she needed to keep her California certification. 
Menzies, slip op. at 2. The evidence establishes, however, that 
Ms. Lee did not pay her dues in April 1987, at least three months 
before she moved to Utah. Defendant's Exhibit 2. Hence, the latest 
she could have legally worked in the California courts was April 
1987, almost a year before this trial.1 
This Court's finding that Ms. Lee believed that all she 
needed to work in Utah was a national certification (Id.) disregards 
the testimony of Linda Van Tassell, who discussed the need for a 
Utah license with Ms. Lee and gave Ms. Lee money to get a Utah 
license prior to Ms. Lee's hiring by Third District Court. 
1. Much of this Court's fact statement is taken from the testimony 
of Ms. Lee. That testimony, however, is internally inconsistent and 
lacking in credibility. 
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R. 1185:29-30, 35-6. It also disregards Ms. Van Tassell's testimony 
that Ms. Lee later told her that she had obtained a Utah license. 
R. 1185:33-4. 
In addition, it ignores the finding contained in the next 
paragraph of the opinion that the administrative office of the 
courts "determined that Lee could hold the position until June, 
1988, when the next Utah examination for certified reporters was 
scheduled." Slip op. at 2, 8-9. Any finding that Ms. Lee was a 
temporary reporter presupposes that Ms. Lee was aware of this 
temporary status and the need for a Utah license in order to become 
a permanent reporter. 
Furthermore, Ms. Lee testified that she was hired as the 
official court reporter and, at the time of her hiring, she 
represented that she had a license in California and the national 
certificate. R. 1166:107-8. 
The finding that Ms. Lee was a temporary reporter is 
supported by a single statement by Ron Gibson. R. 1166:82-3. 
However, Mr. Gibson also testified that Ms. Lee was hired as the 
official court reporter (R. 1166:29), that he was not involved in 
the hiring of Ms. Lee (R. 1166:32), and that he did not become 
familiar with her until three months after she was hired 
(R. 1166:29). He also acknowledged that he told media reporters 
that Ms. Lee had a Utah license. R. 1166:33. 
All of the evidence other than this single statement 
demonstrates that Ms. Lee was not a temporary reporter. Documents 
in her personnel file, her own understanding of her position, 
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letters between court personnel, and Ms. Lee's termination letter 
dated September 1988 (three months after any temporary position 
would have terminated) all refer to Ms. Lee as an official court 
reporter and do not indicate in any way that she was hired in a 
temporary capacity. Defendant's Exhibit, personnel file of Tauni 
Lee. Furthermore, the position did not terminate in June 1988, 
Ms. Lee made no attempt to take the licensing examination at that 
time, and court officials apparently made no request that she do 
so. It is against the clear weight of the evidence to find that 
Ms. Lee was a temporary reporter. 
Although one court reporter testified that he used a 
notereader, his testimony along with that of the other court 
reporters established that such a practice is disfavored and that 
reading the entire transcript prepared by a notereader is required. 
R. 1185:11, 12, 36, 41, 43, 85, 89, 93-94. 
The statement that it is "common practice" to read all of 
the notereader's work (slip op. at 3) minimizes the necessity of a 
reporter reading all work prepared by another in order to honestly 
certify that the transcript accurately reflects what occurred in the 
trial court. R. 1185:11, 12, 43, 93-4. 
Other factual problems occur throughout this opinion which 
make it apparent that this Court relied on an inaccurate 
transcript. For instance, based on a review of the transcript, this 
Court states, "it is clear that the interview took place between 
February 23 and February 29." Slip op. at 27. However, there was 
no February 29 in 1986. 
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POINT II. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS 
CORRECTION OF ERROR FOR CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE 
DETERMINATION. 
Although this Court applied an abuse of discretion standard 
in reviewing the trial court's denial of Mr. Menzies' motion for new 
trial, the issues of whether the court reporter was certified or 
de facto qualified and whether the transcript was adequate for 
appellate review are questions of law which should be reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 
1991); State v. Thomas. 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 23 (Utah 1992) 
(reviewing whether second prong of McDonouah test met under a 
correctness standard while reviewing denial of motion for new trial 
under an abuse of discretion standard). 
Judge Uno did not make a finding that the transcript 
"adequately reflects the proceedings." Slip op. at 4. Instead, he 
determined that he could make sense of the proceedings and that 
there was nothing in the transcript that the five justices of this 
Court and their clerks could not correct. R. 1191:3. Judge Uno 
also found that the "California version" with Ms. Lee's input made 
less sense than the version created by the notereader. R. 1191:66. 
This Court should reconsider the deference accorded the 
trial judge. 
POINT III. "QUALIFICATIONS OF THE COURT 
REPORTER" DO NOT REQUIRE THE APPLICATION OF A 
PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS. 
The opinion indicates that a presumption of correctness 
applies to the transcript based on three alternative analyses: 
(1) that the relevant statutes allowed unlicensed persons to certify 
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transcripts, (2) that Ms. Lee was a de facto court reporter, and 
(3) that Ms. Lee was a temporary reporter. Each of these three 
bases for applying a presumption of correctness is flawed. 
First, regardless of whether the statutes allow an 
unlicensed person to certify a transcript so as to give rise to a 
"presumption of correctness," Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-6 presupposes 
that a person who has not read the transcript cannot "certify" it as 
correct. Ms. Lee never read the entirety of the transcript and 
therefore falsely "certified" the original version as accurately 
reflecting what occurred in court. Where the falsehood of the 
certification is established, the "prima facie correct" analysis 
should not apply. 
The determination that the use of a notereader does not 
preclude using the transcript (slip op. at 9) disregards the fact 
that the notereader was not present and that Ms. Lee's version is 
significantly different from the version prepared by the notereader. 
It is unclear which version of the transcript this Court 
considers the official version to be used on appeal. If it is the 
original version prepared by the notereader, Ms. Lee's reading of 
the notes during the California version is irrelevant and a 
presumption of correctness is being applied to a transcript which 
has not even been reviewed by the court reporter. 
In addition, the statutes seem to require that the only 
exception to the licensing requirement occurs where a person is duly 
appointed as a temporary reporter. Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-15, 17 
and 6 can be read in harmony as requiring that a reporter either be 
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licensed in Utah or appointed as a temporary in compliance with 
§ 78-56-17 to be able to certify a transcript. 
Second, as pointed out in the fact statement, supra at 4-5, 
the clear weight of evidence establishes that Ms. Lee was not a 
temporary reporter. She was appointed as the official reporter, 
stayed in the position after the June expiration date for any 
temporary position, and was not asked to take the June test or leave 
the position even though the Utah court administrator's office knew 
that she had been declared incompetent in California and was 
concerned about her performance. 
The opinion is inconsistent in that it acknowledges that 
Ms. Lee "was appointed court reporter" (slip op. at 3) but also 
claims that she was only a temporary reporter. Furthermore, 
§ 78-56-17 requires that the previous reporter be temporarily 
disabled or removed. Although the opinion states that it is "clear" 
that the previous reporter was either disabled or amoved, such is 
not the case. Bob Lewis, Judge Uno's previous reporter, quit in 
December 1987 to take a job in the federal system. Ms. Lee was not 
a temporary reporter; she was appointed as Judge Uno's official 
court reporter, and it is against the clear weight of evidence for 
this Court to find otherwise. 
Third, although the opinion emphasizes the de facto 
doctrine in concluding that a presumption of correctness applied, 
Judge Uno did not apply such doctrine. Nor did Judge Uno make any 
findings as to whether Ms. Lee assumed the "official authority under 
color of valid appointment" or whether the public acquiesced in the 
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authority. See slip op. at 6. Instead, Judge Uno made a wholly 
distinct finding—that Ms. Lee was de facto qualified for the job.2 
In analyzing the de facto doctrine as it applies to this 
case, the opinion states that "throughout her tenure as a court 
reporter, [Ms. Lee's] eligibility for the position was not 
questioned.11 Slip op. at 6. On the contrary, defense counsel 
questioned Ms. Lee's ability during the course of the trial, after 
she prepared a transcript of the Britton testimony, and after she 
cried. Ms. Lee's personnel file indicates that the court 
administrator's office was aware, sometime prior to May 1988, that 
Ms. Lee had been declared incompetent to act as a court reporter in 
California, and was concerned about her ability to timely complete 
the Menzies transcript as early as June 1988. Defendant's Exhibits 
5, 6, 9.3 
2. Nor did the State argue on appeal that the de facto doctrine 
applied to Ms. Lee so as to make her capable of certifying a 
transcript. 
Although application of the de facto doctrine arguably 
allows use of a transcript prepared by Ms. Lee where the accuracy of 
that transcript is established, it is a leap to apply such a 
doctrine so as to create a presumption that a transcript prepared by 
a de facto reporter is accurate. In other words, while the de facto 
doctrine may be used to refute Mr. Menzies' "per se" argument in 
Point I of his opening brief that a transcript prepared by an 
unlicensed individual cannot ever be used, the doctrine does not 
extend to the application of a presumption. None of the cases cited 
by this Court as part of its de facto analysis involve the 
application of a presumption of correctness. Instead, they simply 
hold that the person could act in the capacity based on their 
de facto status. 
3. Nevertheless, Ms. Lee's position did not terminate in June, and 
she was not required to take the June 1988 reporters examination as 
would have been the case were she appointed as a temporary reporter 
three months after she took the job with Judge Uno. 
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Whether Ms. Lee would have automatically gotten a license 
in Utah had she kept her California license current (slip op. at 7) 
is irrelevant since Ms. Lee had not had a current California license 
in nine months when she took the job in Third District Court. 
Defendant#s Exhibit 2. 
Nor is it true that "if Ms. Lee had understood the need and 
requirements for a Utah license, she could have obtained the 
appropriate certification as easily as she obtained the national 
certification." Slip op. at 7. Utah's licensing requirements were 
stricter than those of the national organization at the time Ms. Lee 
took the job in Third District Court. Furthermore, Ms. Lee was not 
in good standing in California since she had not paid her dues and 
her license had lapsed nine months before. In addition, she was 
encountering problems in California based on her failure to file 
transcripts in cases heard more than nine months earlier. Indeed, 
her problems in California had reached such a peak that she was 
declared incompetent to act in the California courts less than a 
month after the trial in the present case ended. Defendant's 
Exhibit 2, 5. That finding of incompetency has never been lifted 
and she has since been suspended from practice in California. It is 
doubtful that Ms. Lee could have easily obtained a Utah license had 
someone contacted California. 
Finally, even if this transcript were to be considered 
"prima facie correct" under § 78-56-6, the opinion gives too much 
strength to that consideration. The "prima facie correct" language 
of § 78-56-6 is weaker than a presumption of correctness; where a 
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prosecutor makes out a prima facie case, a presumption of guilt does 
not attach. Likewise, even if the transcript were considered 
prima facie correct, it should not be given the tremendous 
presumption of correctness which was afforded in this case. 
POINT IV. THIS COURTS RESOLUTION OF THE 
ACKNOWLEDGED TRANSCRIPTION ERRORS REQUIRES 
RECONSIDERATION. 
The opinion repeatedly relies on other portions of the 
transcript to support its interpretation of the transcript at a 
given spot. E.g., slip op. at 11 ("errors are obvious when viewed 
in the context of the relevant passage") ("defense counsel stated 
that eight jurors were challenged for cause and not dismissed"), 12 
(although some juror answers are inarticulate, a review of 
transcript reveals what their responses were), 14 (determination 
that same basic information is sought in another question), 15 
(although some admonitions were omitted, review of other admonitions 
demonstrates that no prejudice exists), 16 (discrepancies between 
the two versions of the transcript are of minor importance) (look to 
questions asked of jurors to reconstruct list of questions), 18 
(able to tell that gap in jurors responses was not prejudicial by 
looking to the rest of the transcript), 19 (Savage's testimony 
establishes factual basis for Britton claim). Because those other 
portions are potentially equally flawed, such reliance is misplaced. 
In relying on other portions of the transcript as if they 
were accurate, this Court ignores the impact of omissions and 
assumes that Ms. Lee took down everything that was said in court. 
However, the testimony of Ms. Young that Ms. Lee omits portions of 
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what is said (R. 1185:46-8), along with the acknowledgement by this 
Court that gaps occur in the transcript (slip op. at 17, 29), 
establish that Ms. Lee routinely failed to take down portions of 
testimony, arguments and voir dire. It is difficult for defense 
counsel to raise issues contained in those omitted portions or for 
this Court to review any such portions in this case. 
The opinion incorrectly assumes that Ms. Lee was capable of 
taking down everything that was said on the record in court and that 
any difficulties occurred during the transcription process rather 
than during the notetaking process (e.g., slip op. at 11, 12, 15). 
This is contrary to the acknowledgement in other portions of the 
opinion that Ms. Lee omitted portions (Id. at 14, 16-18) and the 
testimony of both court reporters who indicated that Ms. Lee had 
difficulty accurately taking down everything that is said in 
addition to difficulty transcribing her notes. R. 1185:17, 46-8. 
In addition, the opinion gives mixed messages about the 
role of plain error in capital cases. By repeatedly relying on the 
arguments of counsel and the rulings of the trial judge as 
compensating for errors and omissions in this transcript, this Court 
seems to be suggesting that the plain error doctrine and the related 
procedure for reviewing the entire proceedings in a capital case are 
of little importance (e.g. , Id,, at 11, 12, 15, 25). This is 
contrary to the rule that this Court will review the entire 
proceedings in capital cases for manifest error. See State v. 
Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1021-2 (Utah 1989); State v. Tillman, 750 
P.2d 546, 551-3 (Utah 1987). See, e.g., slip op. at 25 ("no such 
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argument was ever raised at trial"). 
Furthermore, the opinion disregards the implication in 
State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8, 36 n.ll (Utah 1989), which 
is extrapolated in State v. Braun. 787 P.2d 1336, 1342 (Utah App. 
1990), that an error which might not be very obvious nevertheless 
requires reversal where it has an overwhelming impact on the 
proceedings. Portions which are not included in the transcript 
cannot be reviewed for obvious error. 
A. TRANSCRIPTION ERRORS DURING VOIR DIRE REQUIRE 
A NEW TRIAL. 
The determination that "[i]n order for mistakes in the 
transcript to prejudice Menzies' appeal, the error must occur in the 
voir dire of a juror who either sat on the case or was challenged 
for cause and not dismissed" (Id.) fails to take into consideration 
the possibility that plain error occurred in failing to remove a 
juror, or that defense counsel ineffectively represented Mr. Menzies 
by failing to challenge a juror for cause. This statement also 
fails to acknowledge the importance of a complete record in 
assessing harmless error. 
In State v. Perrv, 401 N.W.2d 748, 754 (Wise. 1987), cited 
by this Court in footnote 28 on page 10, the court stated: 
An appellate court cannot function if it has no 
way to determine whether error has been 
committed. In most instances, a transcript is 
required for appellant's counsel to locate error 
and for an appellate court to verify or disprove 
it. Frequently, plain error—error usually not 
pinpointed in the course of trial—can only be 
discovered and proved by a transcript. Moreover, 
whether error is prejudicial or harmless is 
usually determinable only in the context of the 
entire record. 
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1. Questions Regarding Capital Punishment 
The fact that the jurors did not decide penalty does not 
erase the death qualification procedure and any errors that occurred 
therein from this Court's review. See slip op. at 12, 15. Errors 
which occurred during death qualification nevertheless impact on the 
guilt/innocence phase. 
First, Ms. Lee did not know the jurors would not decide the 
penalty when she failed to accurately record this critical part of 
voir dire. The errors and omissions during death qualification are 
indicative of the overall inaccuracy of the transcripts. 
In addition, as the defendant claimed in State v. Moore, 
697 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah 1983), "numerous studies ... indicate that 
death qualified juries are more inclined to convict than non-death 
qualified juries." This Court acknowledged in Moore that such 
studies "may well be correct[]." Id. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 
616 P.2d 1301, 1314-25 (Cal. 1980) (outlining various studies which 
analyze the conviction prone attitude of jurors in relation to 
jurors' attitude towards capital punishment; Lockhart v. McCree, 476 
U.S. 162 (1986) (dissent outlines pro-prosecution bias of death 
qualified jurors as established in studies; majority acknowledges 
that at least one of the studies demonstrating that death qualified 
juries were more guilt prone was not fatally flawed). 
A juror who should not have served during the penalty phase 
was equally unqualified to serve during the guilt/innocence phase. 
The fact that the jurors did not decide the penalty in this case 
does not mitigate the possibility that the jurors who decided guilt 
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should have been selected differently. See generally Vasquez v. 
Hillery. 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (racial prejudice in grand jury 
selection not harmless even though defendant subsequently convicted 
since there was no way to determine whether a properly selected 
grand jury would have issued indictments, and, if so, on what 
counts). 
Although the United States Constitution does not preclude 
death qualification of a jury (see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 
(1986), Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution may well preclude 
such a process. 
In addition, the specific answers of the jurors during the 
death qualification process are critical to a determination of 
whether they should have been removed, and should not be dismissed 
by this Court. 
2. Gap in Transcript Purina Voir Dire 
This Court recognizes that a gap occurs in the transcript 
during voir dire after the trial judge asked whether any of the 
jurors or members of their families or close friends had been 
victims of a similar crime. This Court also acknowledges that "it 
is not possible to tell from this portion of the transcript whether 
the gap incorporates testimony of the other jurors." Id. at 18. 
This Court determined, however, that this acknowledged gap is 
inconsequential since counsel did not object to or question further 
any of the jurors based on their experience regarding violent crime. 
This resolution assumes that Ms. Lee accurately took down 
all of defense counsel's challenges and further assumes that defense 
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counsel was not ineffective in failing to question jurors further or 
challenge them for cause. 
Information that a juror or a juror's close friend or 
family member has been the victim of a similar crime is critical 
information in exercising challenges for cause and peremptory 
challenges. See State v. Woolley. 810 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 1991); 
State v. Thomas, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah App. 1992). This 
acknowledged gap in the responses makes it impossible for appellate 
counsel and this Court to review this record to determine whether 
defense counsel adequately explored these areas and made appropriate 
challenges for cause. 
3. Assumption That Trial Judge Asked Question 
Identically Each Time 
Although the opinion acknowledges a gap in the voir dire 
questioning and the possibility that Ms. Lee did not record each 
question as it was asked (slip op. at 15, 17),4 it resolves any 
prejudice arising from this failure by pointing out that the judge 
had a list of standard questions which he asked, and the jurors were 
given a copy of this list. This resolution of the issue assumes 
that the trial judge correctly and identically asked each question 
4. On page 15, the Court states: "There is an indication that 
either the notereader or Ms. Lee failed to record each question as 
it was asked and simply repeated the question asked of previous 
jurors." Unless the inclusion of "the notereader" in this statement 
was an oversight, this statement indicates a fundamental 
misunderstanding on the part of this Court in regard to the 
preparation of the transcript. The notereader was never present in 
court and therefore would not have had the opportunity to fail to 
record anything that was asked. This acknowledged failure is 
attributable only to Ms. Lee. 
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and that the jurors were reading along. 
The resolution of the failure to record all questions 
disregards the acknowledgement in State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 
(Utah 1988), and State v. Bell, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984), of the 
importance of voir dire examination and the subtleties of that 
process. The change of a single word can alter the impact of a 
response as it relates to a defendants exercise of his or her 
challenges. 
The failure to record all voir dire questions requires a 
new trial. State v. Tavlor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983). 
B. ADMONITIONS 
Although the opinion states that the judge conducted a 
second individual interrogation of each juror after a juror was 
contacted and told about Mr. Menzies' prior record, a review of the 
record establishes that Juror Gass was never questioned as to 
whether she had been contacted. T. 2398, 2402. 
C. NUMBERS 
Although many of the numbers contained in this transcript 
are not accurate, the opinion resolves the problem by stating that 
any issues regarding numbers do not involve prejudicial error. This 
position disregards the fact that every number in this transcript is 
unreliable. 
D. IDENTIFICATION OF MENZIES 
This Court acknowledges that discrepancies between the two 
versions exist as to the distance at which Larabee first viewed the 
man at Storm Mountain and the date on which the composite was made. 
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Id. The opinion determines, however, that the discrepancies are 
insignificant because (1) "Larabee identified the man as Menzies" at 
trial, (2) Larabee's later answer establishes what was said earlier 
and he did not see the face until the third viewing, and (3) "[n]o 
motion was ever made to suppress the identification, and no claim 
concerning the identification" was in the docketing statement. Id. 
A review of the record establishes that the opinion 
misconstrues the facts and inappropriately relies on the three bases 
listed above in reaching its conclusion. 
First. Larabee did not identify Menzies at trial. The 
prosecutor never asked Larabee to make an identification, and he did 
not volunteer one. T. 1192-1215. Larabee selected an individual 
other than Menzies at the lineup (T. 1268) and did not identify 
Menzies at the preliminary hearing, which was held after the 
lineup. T. 1279, 1295. 
Although Larabee had said one of the photos in a photo 
spread might be Menzies, he had initially been unable to make a 
selection, and when he ultimately pointed out the photo, he was not 
certain that it was the man he had seen at Storm Mountain. 
T. 1685-6. 
Defense counsel learned for the first tim€>, during 
prosecutor Ernie Jones7 redirect examination of Larabee, that on the 
way back to the prosecutor's office after the lineup, Larabee had 
asked Jones "if it was number 6." T. 1285. Number 6 was Menzies. 
Second. Larabee never saw a frontal view of the man's face 
and was not certain that the man he saw the first time with a woman 
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was the same man he later saw leaving alone, > 'J J" " ! 1 ' i "i1 . 
Third, the State's failure to provide Defendant with 
information as to the post-lineup conversation and Larabee's 
inability to make a positive photo selection are identification 
issues being raised on appeal in this case. Menzies argued in the 
trial court that the State improperly failed to provide this 
information. T 1 296, I! 3 32-5. The trial judge ordered that the 
testimony regarding the post-lineup conversation be stricken based 
o n t h e p r o s e c u t o r " I ii i I 111 i I 11 | • i i i 11 lo I i • i • i >v<] i , ml 1! I ''»'* I 111 II | , 
made a confusing admonishment which may have detracted from 
Menzies's evidence that Larabee picked another individual at the 
discovery violation. -31'3-4. 
!-I IN TRANSCRIPT 
T h e . in in I  iiiMii.i 1 i 'dq i t i f i I lli.il I In I m i l »oi i p t i o n ill "I" h i ^ i 
does not accurately reflect what occurred i  n court and that an 
omission "ranscript occurred. S lip op at 29-30. This Court 
c • omission i^ nsignificant even though there is 
no w . ,»t knowing what is missing, non sequiturs appear in the 
transcript, and significant issues regard i in | |inoi I <i i nt i in i exist in 
this case. In additi on, the acknowledgement that: " -.:,.*<*r 
that an omission occurred" (slip op. r contrasts with the 
testimony of Ms. Lee, who stat* 
was omitted at this point. R. - i.- contrast further 
emphasizes the unreliability of Ms. Lee's work. 
- xJ -
F. RELIANCE ON DOCKETING STATEMENT 
In various portions of the opinion, this Court resolves a 
problem with the transcript by stating that an error has no 
significance on appeal because it does not relate to an issue listed 
in the docketing statement. Slip op. at 14, 26, 28. This focus 
gives an unprecendented and impractical role to a docketing 
statement in the appellate process. 
In this case, as is almost universally the case in indigent 
criminal appeals, the docketing statement was filed before the 
transcript was prepared.5 This case involved a six-week trial; the 
attempts to reconstruct the transcript lasted over a year. In 
recognition of the complexity of this case and the fact that the 
docketing statement did not list all of the issues Menzies intends 
to raise on appeal, Appellants opening brief contained in 
Addendum M a tentative Table of Contents listing potential appeal 
issues in this case. 
Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure outlines the 
purpose of a docketing statement. It states: 
The docketing statement is not a brief and should 
not contain arguments or procedural motions. It 
is used by the appellate court in assigning cases 
to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals 
when both have jurisdiction, in making 
certifications to the Supreme Court, in 
classifying cases for determining priority to be 
5. Rule 9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the 
docketing statement be filed within 21 days of the notice of appeal; 
this is only 11 days after the designation of record is due. 
Rule 11(e)(1), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Rules of 
Appellate Procedure do not contemplate that an appellant will have a 
transcript when preparing a docketing statement. 
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accorded them, in making summary dispositions 
when appropriate, and in making calendar 
assignments. 
(emphasis added). 
The opinion uses the docketing statement for a purpose for 
which it was not intended to be used under the rules or at the time 
of its preparation. 
Furthermore, appellate counsel for criminal defendants has 
the responsibility in al 1 cases, but In particular capital cases, 
t en I 'HV i P U -i I i H I M i: j p t t i l e t e r n i i UP WIJ 
docketed all meritorious appellate issues or has failed to raise in 
the trial court an issue which either creates plain error or results 
" i<»f t e e t I v '•. .it ,K i s I. a11, i , ' - j >M .e I
 x s s u e s _ ^ necessarily 
not be included in the docketing statement. 
Ever -. f this Court maintains i ts position regarding the 
I tin k I ' iiji" i c a n c e o f the e r r o r s in tin,1 t r a n s c r i p t , Mr. Menzies 
respectfully requests that it reconsider its decision to rely on the 
d o c k e t i n g s tatemen f .\i•; 1 1 II i 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 I I n i / • , i • , m i » > « , 1 1 n l 1 1 i s i • , . i s c • . 
CONCLUSION 
Mr Menzies respectfully requests that this Court 
reconsider i f c < 1 P ' • i s \ o\ \ a n d reliea i I h<» t s s u e s MI > L I u i I ii 1 it11 e I n • 
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ADDENDUM A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter, 
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HALL. Chief Justice: 
Ralph Leroy Menzies appeals from the denial of i;is 
motion for a new trial. We affirm. The issue on appeal is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in rulinq that 
the record is sufficient, for appellate review. 
On March 8, 1988, altei a jury trial, Menzies was 
convicted of first degree murder,J a capital offense, and 
aggravated kidnaping,2
 a first degree felony. He waived the 
right to a jury for the penalty phase of the proceedings, and 
the trial court sentenced him to death. On May 26, 1988, he 
filed a docketing statement in this court, raising twenty-nine 
issues on appeal. The trial transcript was certified on 
September 5, 1988. In preparing his brief, Menzies observed 
that the record contained numerous transcription errors. On 
November 15, 1989, prior to submitting his brief, Menzies 
filed a "motion to set aside judgment and/or for a new trial" 
on the ground that transcription errors rendered the record 
inadequate for appeal. The trial court referred the matter to 
this court, and Menzies modified his motion to include claims 
concerning the qi lalifications of the cour t reporter. 
1. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202. 
2. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302. 
We remanded the case to the trial court to conduct 
proceedings to correct the record, pursuant to rule 11(h) of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court,3 We also directed the 
trial court to rule on Menzies' motion for a new trial and to 
resolve all issues relating to the qualifications of the court 
reporter and the adequacy of the transcript. 
On remand, several hearings were held in the trial 
court. It was established at these hearings that the court 
reporter, Ms. Tauni Lee, was not licensed in the state of 
Utah. However, evidence was presented that Lee attended 
Empire Business College in Santa Rosa, California, where she 
completed a twenty-month course in court reporting. In 1985, 
Lee passed the California certified shorthand reporter 
examination. She tested at a speed of 200 words per minute 
and received an overall score of 97 percent. From August 1985 
through July 1987, she worked as a certified court reporter in 
municipal court in Sonoma County and in municipal and superior 
court in Marin County. During her tenure in California, Lee 
completed several transcripts that were used for appeals. 
In July 1987, Lee moved to Utah. She stopped paying 
her California dues because she believed it was no longer 
necessary to retain her California certification. By reason 
of nonpayment of dues, her California certification lapsed. 
Lee, thinking that a national certification was all that was 
needed to work in Utah, applied for certification from the 
National Shorthand Reporters Association (MNSRA"). On the 
basis of her California test scores, Lee obtained a national 
certification and began paying dues to the NSRA. 
In January 1988, Lee was appointed court reporter in 
the Third Judicial District Court. The administrative office 
of the courts was aware that Lee was not licensed in Utah. 
However, on the basis of her qualifications and because she 
was the only applicant, the office determined that Lee could 
hold the position until June 1988, when the next Utah 
examination for certified reporters was scheduled. This 
determination was based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17, which 
provides for the appointment of unlicensed court reporters on 
a temporary basis.^ Lee reported Menzies' trial in February 
and March 1988. 
In preparing the transcript of Menzies' trial, Lee 
used a note reader and a proofreader. The note reader would 
transcribe Lee's shorthand notes and mark any portions of the 
transcript where she had difficulty reading the notes. Lee 
would then proofread the portions of the transcript that were 
marked. The proofreader read over the rest of the 
3. R. Utah S. Ct. 11(h) (1988). In 1990, the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court were amended. Similar procedures can 
presently be found in Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h). 
4. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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transcripts, looking foi misspellings and similar errors. It 
was established in the hearings that certified reporters use 
note readers in preparing transcripts, and Lee's note reader 
was considered "excellent." However, it was common practice 
for the coi irt reporter to proofread all the work prepared by a 
note reader. 
1n November 19 9 0, the tria 1 court denied Menzies" 
motion for a new trial based on Lee's licensure status, The 
court ruled that Lee was "de facto" qualified because of her 
"training, testing, and experience." The court also ruled 
that for a new trial to be granted on the basis of tran-
scription errors, Menzies must show that the errors are 
uncorrectable and prejudicial. After this ruling, the pait ies 
continued i n thei r attempts to correct the record. 
A s par{- 0£ ^e procedures to COrrect the record, Lee 
read from her shorthand notes while representatives of both 
parties read from a copy of the original transcript. 
Discrepancies between the original version and Lee's notes 
were noted on this copy of the transcript. Because the 
process was conducted in California, this copy of the 
transcript is referred to as the "California version." 
addition to the proofreading of the original transcript, 
several motions and stipulations were filed in an attempt r » 
correct the record. However, in many instances, the parties 
were unable to agree on what had occurred at trial, and 
therefore, the record could not be corrected through the 
procedures of rule 11(h). 
Proceedings were also conducted to determine if the 
errors that existed in the record warrant a new trial. It was 
established that the trial judge, a member of the prosecutor's 
staff, and two lawyers representing Menzies had read the 
transcript from cover to cover. After this extensive review, 
the trial court concluded that none of the transcription 
errors were prejudicial. On February 20, 1991, the trial 
court issued its final ruling, denying Menzies' motion for a 
new trial on the ground that "the transcript is sufficiently 
accurate to afford defendant a full and fai r review of his 
issues on appeal." The court also designated the California 
version of the transcript, as well as the original version of 
the t ran s c r i p t, as pa rt o£ t he re c o rd on appeal. 
In the instant appeal, we review on] y issues 
concerning the adequacy of the transcript We do not reach 
the merits of the conviction and sentence, 
I, STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The decision to grant a new trial pursuant UJ ui an 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 i s a matter within the 
discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, we will no! 
reverse a ruling denying a new trial "absent a cl eat abuse oi 
Nn . Mil 0 1 lb 1 
that discretion."5 Generally, we will not find abuse of 
discretion unless, given the applicable facts and law, the 
trial court's decision is unreasonable.^ indeed, granting 
the trial court deference is appropriate. The judge who 
presided over the trial is in a far better position to 
determine whether the record adequately reflects the 
proceedings. 
We also note that in appeals from trials where a 
sentence of death is imposed, the scope of appellate review is 
expanded. -This Court will review errors raised and briefed 
on appeal in death penalty cases, even though no proper 
objection was made at trial, but will reverse a conviction 
based upon such errors only if they meet the manifest and 
prejudicial error standard."7 In addition, we have the 
prerogative to notice plain errors that are apparent on the 
face of the record even if the appellant does not complain of 
the error on appeal.8 To be considered plain or manifest 
error, an error must be both harmful and obvious.9 
II. QUALIFICATIONS OF THE COURT REPORTER 
At the trial level, Menzies argued that because Lee 
was not licensed in Utah, the transcript she prepared could 
not be used on appeal. The trial court rejected this 
argument, ruling that Lee's licensure status did not affect 
the validity of the transcript because Lee was "de facto" 
qualified. On appeal, Menzies claims that this ruling 
constitutes abuse of discretion. 
Menzies' argument is based on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-56-15,10 which provides that "no person may be 
5. State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985); see 
also State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Weaver, 6 P.2d 167, 169 (Utah 1931); State v. Mellor, 272 P. 
635, 639 (Utah 1928). 
6. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 805 n.19 
(Utah 1991); Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 534 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
7. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 553 (Utah 1987). 
Although Tillman is a plurality opinion, all five justices 
concurred in the portion of the opinion which delineates the 
appropriate scope of review. Id. at 552-53, 577, 582, 583, 
591. 
8. IJLL at 552-53. 
9. See State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989)? see also State v. Holland, 777 
P.2d 1019, 1026 n.3 (Utah 1989). 
10. Menzies also cites a similar provision in Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 11(e). However, this rule was not in 
effect at the time Menzies was tried, and no analogous 
(Continued on page 5.) 
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appointed w the position of -horthand reporter nor act in 
that capacity . unless in has received a certificate from 
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing," and 
on Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) and Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 26(10), which provide for mandatory review of the 
"entire record" in every case in which a sentence of death is 
imposed. Menzies asserts that these statutes and rule 26(30) 
implicitly provide that only a transcript prepared by a 
certified reporter may be used to review a capital case iii 
the alternative, he argues that even if the transcript can be 
used, the presumption that the record is correct, provided in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-6, should not apply to a transcript 
that was not prepared by a certified reporter,^-
However, section 78-56-15, section 76-3-206;-,, 
rule 26(10) neither prohibit the use of transcripts prepared 
by an uncertified reporter nor revoke the presumption of 
correctness for transcripts prepared by uncertified reporters. 
Furthermore, although section 78-56-15 requires a Utah license 
for the position of court reporter, section 78-56-17 provides 
for unlicensed court reporters under certain conditions.*2 
The rules of statutory construction require that these 
sections be read together, harmonizing their provisions so 
that neither section negates a part of the other.13 Given 
this rule of construction, section 78-56-15 cannot be read as 
a total prohibition against the use of transcripts prepared by 
uncertified reporters. Nor can this section be read as 
providing that transcripts prepared by uncertified reporters 
are not entitled to the presumption of correctness. There-
fore, Menzies1 statutory argument is no' compelling. 
In
 d ny event, the trie. ..ourt's ruling was not based 
on statutory construction, but on the finding that Lee was 
de facto qualified to report the case. Utah, along with many 
other jurisdictions, has adopted the de facto officials 
doctrine,14 Under this doctrine, persons who are 
(Footnote 10 continued.) 
language exists in the Rules • .. . ,
 M W5*_ 
R. Utah S. Ct. 11. 
11. Utah Code Ann, § /ti-r>: • provides, nA transcript oi a 
reporter's notes, written in longhand or typewritten, 
certified by him as being a correct transcript of evidence a**u 
proceedings, is prima facie a correct statement of such, 
evidence and proceeding." 
12. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. Rule 3-304 of 
the Code of Judicial Administration also provides for the 
appointment of unlicensed reporters under conditions where 
certified shorthand reporters are not available. 
13. Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991); 
Murray Citv v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983); Millett 
v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). 
14. Vance v. Fordham, 671 P. 2d ] 24, 1 30 ?1 (rT| ah) . cert^ 
denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1983). 
5 r *R0ifii 
technically ineligible for a public office may be considered 
de facto officials if they assume official authority under 
color of a valid appointment and public acquiescence in the 
authority.15 In the interest of justice, the actions of a 
de facto official are considered valid as to third persons and 
the public.16 Utah courts have relied on this doctrine to 
uphold the actions of administrative committees even though 
one of their members failed to meet the statutory requirements 
to sit on the committee;17 the actions of district judges 
sitting on the supreme court;18 and the actions of a county 
attorney even though the attorney had never posted a required 
bond.19 Other jurisdictions have applied the de facto 
doctrine to myriad actions taken by various public 
officials,20 including actions of de facto court 
reporters.21 
The circumstances of the instant case clearly fall 
within this doctrine. Lee assumed authority as a court 
reporter under color of a valid appointment, and the public 
acquiesced in her authority. Indeed, throughout her tenure as 
a court reporter, her eligibility for the position was not 
questioned. Furthermore, the trial court found that on the 
15. Vance, 671 P.2d at 130-31 & n.5; see also State v. 
Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The de 
facto doctrine discussed in Vance may also apply in situations 
where there is not an appointment under color of law. Vance, 
671 P.2d at 130-31 & n.5. 
16. Vance, 671 P.2d at 130-31 & n.5; see also Gambrell, 814 
P.2d at 1139. 
17. Vance, 671 P.2d at 130-31 & n.5. 
18. In re Thompson's Estate, 269 P. 103, 128 (Utah 1927). 
19. Gambrell, 814 P.2d at 1139. 
20. See, e.g., In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project IB, 
389 P.2d 538, 552 (Cal.) (upheld actions of redevelopment 
agency though one of its members ineligible because not 
resident of proper city), cert, denied, 379 U.S. 28 (1964); 
People v. Montova, 616 P.2d 156, 162 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980) 
(upheld action of special prosecutor who was ineligible 
because member of attorney general's office); Olathe Hospital 
Found., Inc. v. Extendicare, Inc., 539 P.2d 1, 12 (Kan. 1975) 
(upheld action of appeals panel though some of panel members* 
terms had expired); Marshall v. Keller, 226 N.E.2d 743, 745 
(Ohio 1967) (upheld actions of industrial commission though 
some members ineligible); People v. Jackson, 558 N.Y.S.2d 590, 
590 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (upheld conviction though 
prosecuting attorney not member of any bar); see also Hussey 
v. Smith, 99 U.S. 20, 24 (1878); State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 
449, 471-72 (1871). 
21. Bavte v. State, 599 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); 
Stacv v. Waoers, 264 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959); 
Harris County v. Hunt, 388 S.W.2d 459, 465 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 
1965) . 
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basis of luii "training, testing, and experience," Lee was 
qualified to transcribe Menzies' trial, and Lee believed ttlat 
she had the certification necessary for the position. 
Clearly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
ruling that Lee was de facto qualified to report the case AM 
a de facto reporter, any transcript which Lee prepared is 
entitled to the same treatment as a transcript prepared by a 
court reporter whose eligibility for the position is not 
questioned. 
Menzies does not contend that the de facto doctrine 
should not apply to court reporters; rather, he argues that 
the trial court erred in finding that Lee possessed the 
qualifications for the position. In support of this 
assertion, Menzies points to evidence produced at the hearings 
which tends to show that Lee did not possess the qualifications 
of a court reporter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16.22 
Specifically, he asserts that evidence was presented showing 
that Lee lacked the requisite skill and was of bad moral 
character. However, the existence of conflicting evidence is 
not sufficient to set aside a trial court's finding.23 A 
trial court's factual findings will not be disturbed unless 
an appellate court, giving deference to the trial court's 
superior position to assess credibility, nevertheless 
concludes that the finding is clearly erroneous.24 
In the instant case, there was sufficient evidence 
concerning Lee's training, testing, and experience to support 
the trial judge's determination that Lee was qualified. 
Indeed, it was established that if Lee had kept her California 
certification current! she could have obtained a Utah license 
without taking the Utah test.25 It appears, therefore, that 
if Lee had understood the need and requirements for a Utah 
license, she coiild have obtained the appropriate certification 
as easily as she obtained the national certification. Further-
more, the trial court had sufficient information from the 
22. Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16 establishes the requirements 
for court reporters and provides, "Any citizen of the United 
States at least 18 years of age, of good moral character, who 
possesses a high degree of skill and ability in the art of 
shorthand reporting, and who passes a satisfactory examination 
as provided :i n this chapter, is entitled to a certificate 
if 
23. See state v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah HUH), 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
24. See Goodman. 763 P.2d at 788; Walker, 743 P.2d at 193, 
25. Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-12 provides, HThe division may 
issue a license without examination to a person who has been 
licensed in any state, district or territory of the United 
States or in any foreign country, whose education, experience, 
and examination requirements are, or were at the time the 
license was issued, equa] b ^: -* of this state." 
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testimony and the court's dealing with Lee to make a 
determination as to her "moral character." 
In addition to the de facto doctrine, another ground 
supports the trial court's ruling that the transcript may be 
used and is entitled to the presumption of correctness. It is 
clear that, as a matter of law, Lee was a temporary reporter 
and therefore had the statutory authority to report the case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17. Although the trial 
court did not base its ruling on section 78-56-17, we may 
uphold a trial court's ruling on any proper ground.26 
Section 78-56-17 provides: 
If any regularly appointed certified 
shorthand reporter is disabled from 
performing his duty or is removed from his 
position, the judge of the court in which 
that certified shorthand reporter has been 
appointed may appoint any substitute he 
deems competent to act during such 
temporary disability of the regular 
reporter and until his successor is 
appointed. The temporary appointment shall 
continue only until the next regular 
examination for certified shorthand 
reporters held by the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
The administrative office of the courts determined 
that despite the fact that Lee did not have a Utah license, 
she could work as a temporary reporter pursuant to this 
section. This determination is undoubtedly correct. The 
plain language of the statute establishes that a "temporary 
substitute" does not have to meet the requirements of a 
"regularly appointed certified shorthand reporter," but only 
needs to be deemed competent by the trial judge.27 In the 
instant case, the record clearly establishes that both the 
trial judge and the administrative office of the courts found 
that Lee was qualified for the position. Moreover, it was 
26. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30; see also Buehner Block Co. v. 
UWC Assoc., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); Citv Elec. v. 
Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1984). 
27. When the terms of a statute are plain, we construe the 
statute in accord with its usual and accepted meaning. See, 
e.g., Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); 
Utah County v. Orem Citv, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985). 
Indeed, apart from the plain language stating that a temporary 
reporter need only be "deemed competent," the provision that a 
temporary reporter may hold the position only until the next 
scheduled test supports the interpretation that an uncertified 
reporter may work as a temporary reporter. 
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established cnat Lee was the only applicant for the position, 
and she reported Menzies' case between the time she was hired 
and the time of the "next regular examination f--" <-rMfied 
shorthand reporters." 
Menzies argues that section 78-56-1 7 cannot apply :i n 
this case because the record does not show that Lee's 
predecessor was "disabled" or "removed from his position 
However, the record reveals that there was a vacancy. The 
precise reason for the vacancy has no bearing on Lee's status 
as a temporary reporter. Clearly, the former court reporter 
must have been either "disabled" or "rei noved" for the vacancy 
to exist. Therefore, Lee had the statutory authority to 
report Menzies* case, and pursuant to section 78-56-17, the 
transcript may be used on appeal and is entitled to the 
presumption of correctness. 
Menzies also argues that Lee's use of a note reader 
precludes the use of the transcript on appeal or, alterna-
tively, prevents the transcript from being presumed correct. 
As noted above, however, it was established that certified 
court reporters use note readers and that the note reader Lee 
used was considered "excellent." While Lee did not initially 
proofread the entire transcript, a general procedure when 
using a note reader, she did read over all her notes during 
the proceedings to correct the record. Given these facts, 
there is no basis for the assertion that Menzies is entitled 
to a new trial because Lee used a note reader to assist i n the 
preparation of the transcript. 
We therefore conclude that the trial cour I: did not 
abuse its discretion in ruling that Menzies is not entitled to 
a new trial by reason of Lee's licensure status and that the 
transcript Lee prepared :i s ent:i 11 ed I: o t: he presumption of 
correctness 
III TRANSCRIPTION ERRORS 
Menzies claims that he is entitled to a new tri. 
the ground that transcription errors rendered the record 
inadequate for appeal. Specifically, he argues that the trial 
judge erred in ruling that a new trial will not be granted 
unless it is shown that the transcription errors prejudiced 
Menzies' appeal. In the alternative, Menzies claims that the 
trial court erred in ruling that none of the transcription 
errors are prejudicia3 
A. Requi remen t of Prejudice 
Menzies' first argument, that he is not required to 
show prejudice, is based on Lee's licensure status and the 
fact that there are numerous transcription errors in the 
record As he] d above, Lee meets the requirements of both a 
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de facto reporter and a temporary reporter; therefore, the 
instant transcript is to be treated as any other transcript 
certified on appeal. Furthermore, while it is true that the 
record contains transcription errors, the mere existence of 
such errors does not mandate a new trial. The clear weight of 
authority requires a showing of prejudice to overturn a 
conviction on the basis of transcription errors.28 Indeed, 
this court has followed such an approach.29 
In State v. Taylor,30 we reversed a conviction on 
the ground that omissions in the transcript rendered the 
record inadequate for appeal. In so holding, we did not 
simply note that the transcript did not accurately reflect the 
proceedings. Rather, we emphasized that extensive omissions 
in the voir dire of jurors who were challenged for cause and 
whose recorded answers illustrated prejudice prevented review 
of the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in not 
dismissing the jurors,21 a claim that could have resulted in 
reversal.32 we hold, therefore, that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in ruling that Menzies must show that 
his appeal is prejudiced by the transcription errors in order 
to be granted a new trial. 
B. Errors Claimed to be Prejudicial 
Menzies' second argument, that many of the 
transcription errors are prejudicial, focuses on general 
errors that occurred in portions of the transcript relating to 
voir dire and the admission of the preliminary testimony of 
Walter Britton. In addition, Menzies cites specific errors 
relating to the transcription of numbers, the penalty phase, 
28. See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 374 F.2d 24, 26 
(10th Cir. 1966); Stirone v. United States, 341 F.2d 253, 255 
(3d Cir.), cert, denied, 381 U.S. 902 (1965); United States v. 
Sioal, 341 F.2d 837, 850 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 811 
(1965); Addison v. United States, 317 F.2d 808, 810 (5th Cir. 
1963), cert, denied, 376 U.S. 905 (1964); People v. Chessman, 
341 P.2d 679, 690-92 (Cal.), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 925 
(1959); People v. Feiqin, 345 P.2d 273, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1959); State v. Perry, 401 N.W.2d 748, 752 (Wis. 1987); see 
also Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Court Reporter—Dead 
or Disabled, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049, 1061 (1987); Seldon R. 
Shapiro, Annotation, Court Reporting—Omissions, 12 A.L.R. 
Fed. 584, 586 (1972). 
29. State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 445-47 (Utah 1983); see 
also Emia v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043, 1048-49 (Utah 1985); 
Whetton v. Turner, 497 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1972), cert, 
denied, 414 U.S. 862 (1973); Utah R. Crim. P. 30. 
30. 664 P.2d 439. 
31. Id. at 445-47. 
32. Id. at 447; State v. Bailev, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 
1980); State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629, 631 (Utah 1977). 
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and the swearing in of witnesses. In a related claim, he 
argues that he is prejudiced because the transcription errors 
prevent an adequate review of the record for plain error. 
However, a review of the record reveals that none of 
the cited errors are prejudicial. The errors are obvious in 
nature and reconcilable when viewed in the context of the 
relevant passage or by referring to documentary evidence, and 
none have any bearing upon issues raised on appeal. Further-
more, it is possible to cure any conceivably prejudicial 
errors without retrying the case. This can be seen by 
addressing Menzies' claims separately. 
1. Voir Dire 
Menzies advances several claims of error relating to 
the voir dire portion of the transcript. Specifically, 
Menzies asserts that (1) some of the prospective jurors' 
responses to questions are unintelligible and/or do not make 
sense, (2) the note reader "made up" admonitions, questions, 
and answers, and (3) questions and answers are omitted from 
the transcript. Because of these errors, Menzies argues that 
neither version of the transcript can be used to review 
appellate issues relating to voir dire. 
Voir dire in the instant case was extensive. It 
lasted approximately one week, and thirty-one jurors were 
dismissed for cause. There was a general voir dire, during 
which prospective jurors were questioned as a group, followed 
by individual voir dire. The individual voir dire was 
primarily concerned with capital punishment. Menzies* original 
docketing statement raised two claims relating to voir dire. 
He asserted that the court committed reversible error by 
refusing to excuse certain jurors who were challenged for 
cause and abused its discretion by rehabilitating prospective 
jurors. Objections made at trial preserved these issues. 
Before examining Menzies' specific claims, it is 
important to note that it is not necessary to examine the voir 
dire of every prospective juror. In order for mistakes in the 
transcript to prejudice Menzies* appeal, the error must occur 
in the voir dire of a juror who either sat on the case or was 
challenged for cause and not dismissed. 
The jurors who sat on the panel are easily 
identifiable from the jury list, the polling of the jury after 
the conviction, and a second voir dire that took place late in 
the trial after one of the jurors received prejudicial 
information from an anonymous phone call. Likewise, it is 
possible to determine which jurors were challenged for cause 
and not dismissed. At the end of voir dire, defense counsel, 
in order to preserve her objections for appeal, stated that 
eight jurors were challenged for cause and not dismissed. 
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Review of the transcript confirms the fact that eight jurors 
were challenged for cause and not dismissed. 
(a) Answers unintelliq ible. 
Several of Menzies* unintelligible or inappropriate 
answers cites involve voir dire of pertinent jurors. However, 
a review of the transcript reveals that the jurors* responses 
are readily reconcilable and/or nonprejudicial. 
It is true that some of the jurors' answers are 
inarticulate.33 However, this may well be attributable to 
the jurors, not to the reporter. In any event, in each 
instance, one is able to ascertain that the juror is 
appropriately responding to the question posed. Difficultly 
with the answers can generally be reconciled by viewing the 
answer in the context of the question, and in each instance, 
it is possible to understand the juror's response. Further-
more, a vast majority of errors cited by Menzies relate to 
capital punishment. However, the jurors did not sit for the 
penalty phase of the proceedings. These questions are not 
highly relevant to an appeal of Menzies' conviction, and 
therefore, slight confusion surrounding these questions is n u 
prejudicial. In addition, there are only one to four errors 
in a given juror's voir dire, and the voir dire questions are 
33. The following are examples of alleged transcript errors 
cited by Menzies: 
A JUROR: MY NAME IS KATHLEEN WINN. I 
WORK FOR FIRST INTERSTATE BANK IN THE 
SPECIALIZED DEPARTMENT. 
• • • • 
THE COURT: WHAT RELATIONSHIP SHOULD 
THERE BE, IF ANY, BETWEEN WHAT THE VICTIM 
SUFFERED AND WHAT THAT PERSON THAT CAUSED 
THAT SHOULD SUFFER? 
A JUROR: AGAIN, IT'S BACK TO MY 
FEELINGS. IF THE INDIVIDUAL PREMEDITATEDLY 
OR PLANNED IT OUT THOROUGHLY AND KNEW 
EXACTLY WHAT HE OR SHE WAS DOING, WHICH TO 
ME WOULD BE A DIFFICULT THING FOR THAT 
INDIVIDUAL TO DO, IF THAT INDIVIDUAL WAS 
PROVEN THAT THEY DID DO THAT, THEN THAT 
RELATIONSHIP PROBABLY SHOULD BE DEATH 
PENALTY. 
BUT IF THE INDIVIDUAL DID NOT, WHICH 
MY FEELING, I GUESS. THAT THERE IS A 
DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP THERE BETWEEN WHAT 
THE VICTIM SUFFERED VERSUS—THERE IS A LOT 
OF MENTAL SUFFERING, OBVIOUSLY, FROM--I 
WOULD HOPE FROM THE PERPETRATOR'S SIDE, AND 
THAT WOULD, TO ME, BE AN IMMENSE LOAD TO 
HANDLE. 
NO. 880161 12 
redundant.34 The prejudicial effect of a transcription 
34. The following is a list of the individual voir dire 
questions: 
(1) HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY? 
(2) WHY? 
(3) HAVE YOU EVER SHARED WITH ANYONE ELSE 
YOUR FEELINGS ON THE DEATH PENALTY? 
(4) WITH WHOM? 
(5) HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THE DEATH PENALTY EVER 
CHANGED? 
(6) ARE YOU PRESENTLY IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED 
TO WHAT PENALTY A PERSON CONVICTED OF 
FIRST DEGREE MURDER SHOULD RECEIVE? 
(7) SHOULD THIS TRIAL ENTER A PENALTY PHASE, 
WOULD YOU FOLLOW THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 
AND VOTE FOR THE PENALTY ONLY IF THE 
STATE HAS PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND 
THAT THE DEATH PENALTY IS THE ONLY 
APPROPRIATE PENALTY? 
(8) DO YOU BELIEVE THAT ALL PERSONS CONVICTED 
OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER SHOULD BE PUT TO 
DEATH? 
(9) UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCE DO YOU FEEL 
PUTTING SOMEONE TO DEATH IS WARRANTED? 
(10) DO YOU BELIEVE THE DEATH PENALTY IS 
ORDINARILY PROPER PUNISHMENT FOR THE 
CRIME OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER? 
(11) IF THE JURY SHOULD CONVICT MR. MENZIES OF 
FIRST DEGREE MURDER, WOULD YOU BE ABLE TO 
CONSIDER VOTING FOR A SENTENCE LESS THAN 
DEATH? 
(12) IS LIFE IN PRISON A SEVERE PENALTY IN 
YOUR OPINION? 
(13) WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND A LIFE TERM IN 
PRISON TO MEAN? 
(14) WOULD YOU VOTE FOR THE DEATH SENTENCE IN 
ORDER TO INSURE THAT NO RELEASE FROM 
PRISON EVER OCCURRED? 
(15) HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT OUR CURRENT SYSTEM 
OF RELEASING CONVICTED PERSONS FROM 
PRISON ON PAROLE AFTER APPROVAL FROM THE 
BOARD OF PARDONS? 
(16) DO YOU BELIEVE THAT A LIFE SENTENCE COULD 
ACCOMPLISH THE SAME GOAL OF PREVENTING 
REPEATED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN THE SAME 
WAY AS THE DEATH PENALTY? 
(17) DO YOU SEE ANY CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE 
DEATH PENALTY AND THE TEACHINGS OF YOUR 
RELIGION? 
(Continued on page 14.) 
13 Nn . nnm c^ 
error in a voir dire question is diminished where the same 
basic information is sought in another question.3^ Given 
these facts, the instances of inarticulate answers are not 
prejudicial. 
(b) Note reader "made up" admonitions, questions, and 
answers. 
(i) Admonitions. The court reporter did not 
record some of the judge's admonitions. Instead, she often 
used asterisks to represent admonitions throughout the 
transcript. However, Menzies, in his original docketing 
statement, did not raise the claim that the jurors were 
subject to improper influences or acted in an improper 
manner. Many of the judge's admonitions were properly 
recorded. Furthermore, near the end of the trial, after one 
(Footnote 34 continued.) 
(18) WHAT RELATIONSHIP SHOULD THERE BE, IF 
ANY, BETWEEN WHAT THE VICTIM SUFFERED AND 
WHAT THE PERSON THAT CAUSED THAT SHOULD 
SUFFER? 
(19) ARE YOU WILLING TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE 
WHICH MITIGATES IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT 
AND A LIFE SENTENCE SHOULD THIS TRIAL 
ENTER A PENALTY PHASE? 
(20) IF A PERSON WERE TO BE CONVICTED OF FIRST 
DEGREE MURDER, WHAT INFORMATION WOULD YOU 
THEN LIKE TO KNOW BEFORE MAKING A 
DECISION AS TO A PENALTY? 
(21) DO YOU BELIEVE A PERSON CAN CHANGE AND 
BECOME BETTER OVER TIME? 
(22) HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE PSYCHIATRIC 
PROFESSION? 
(23) CAN SOCIAL WORKERS OR PSYCHOLOGISTS HELP 
PEOPLE CHANGE? 
(24) DOES THE FACT THAT QUESTIONS CONCERNING 
THE DEATH PENALTY HAVE BEEN ASKED RAISE 
DOUBTS IN YOUR MIND AS TO THE INNOCENCE 
OR GUILT OF MR. MENZIES? 
(25) DO YOU HAVE ANY CONCERNS THAT YOU MIGHT 
BE CRITICIZED FOR NOT IMPOSING A DEATH 
PENALTY? 
(26) WHAT WOULD YOUR FEELINGS BE ABOUT SERVING 
ON A JURY WHOSE FUNCTION IS TO TRY A 
FIRST DEGREE MURDER CASE WHERE IF THE 
PERSON IS CONVICTED, YOU WILL HAVE TO 
CONSIDER IMPOSITION OF A DEATH SENTENCE? 
35. See generally State v. Miller. 727 P.2d 203, 206 (Utah 
1986); State v. Larocco. 665 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Sessions. 645 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982) (all holding 
no error in refusing to grant instruction if point is covered 
in another instruction). 
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juror was exposed to prejudicial information, the trial judge 
conducted a second individual interrogation of each juror, 
inquiring whether any of them had been subjected to any 
outside influence. The record, therefore, is adequate to 
review any claim relating to admonitions* and jury misconduct. 
(ii) Questions. There is an indication that either 
the note reader or Lee failed to record each question as it 
was asked and simply repeated the question asked of previous 
jurors. This is apparent because an error in a question 
concerning capital punishment was repeated throughout the 
transcript.36 Beginning with the third prospective juror, 
each juror was asked, "DO YOU BELIEVE THAT A LIFE SENTENCE 
COULD ACCOMPLISH THE SAME GOAL OF REPEATED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
IN THE SAME WAY AS THE DEATH PENALTY?" The first and second 
jurors were asked if life imprisonment could accomplish the 
goal of preventing repeated criminal activity. However, no 
juror appears to have been confused by the question. When a 
juror's answer involved more than yes or no, it was clear that 
the juror understood the question. Neither the defense nor 
the prosecution challenged the propriety or the content of the 
question. Furthermore, the prospective jurors were given a 
list of the questions and could read along as the judge asked 
them. Given these facts, it is likely that the jurors were 
asked the correct question. 
Even assuming that this mistake cannot be 
reconciled, it is not prejudicial. The question is one 
directed toward capital punishment and is therefore not 
directly at issue in the case. This is particularly true in 
this instance, where confusion occurs only if jurors* answers 
are limited to yes or no. In addition, there are other 
appropriate questions which cover the same basic issue.37 
This error, therefore, does not prejudice Menzies' appeal. 
(iii) Answers. Close examination of the pertinent 
prospective juror responses does not reveal any instances 
36. Menzies' contention that some voir dire questions have 
not been recorded is addressed infra notes 40-48 and 
accompanying text. 
37. Examples include: 
IS LIFE IN PRISON A SEVERE PENALTY IN YOUR 
OPINION? 
WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND A LIFE TERM IN 
PRISON TO MEAN? 
WOULD YOU VOTE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
ORDER TO INSURE THAT NO RELEASE FROM PRISON 
EVER OCCURRED? 
HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT OUR CURRENT SYSTEM OF 
RELEASING CONVICTED PERSONS FROM PRISON ON 
PAROLE AFTER APPROVAL FROM THE BOARD OF 
PARDONS? 
15 No. ftfinui 
where the note reader "made up" actual juror answers. There 
are a few discrepancies between the original transcript and 
the court reporter's notes. However, these discrepancies are 
minor in nature and do not bear upon the substance of the 
prospective juror's response,38 and again, a vast majority 
of these discrepancies occur in questions concerning capital 
punishment. Given these facts, the discrepancies are not 
prejudicial. 
(c) Omissions. 
Menzies asserts that the transcript lacks voir dire 
questions and answers. In support of this contention, he 
cites to portions of the transcript which deal with individual 
voir dire. By reason of the fact that the same questions weie 
asked of each juror, it is possible to reconstruct the list of 
individual voir dire questions and compare the list with the 
testimony of the pertinent prospective jurors.39 Such an 
approach reveals that in voir dire of two pertinent jurors, 
the transcript does not contain a question asked of all other 
pertinent jurors.40 The individual voir dire questions were 
read from a prepared list; therefore, it is likely that these 
questions were asked but not recorded. 
In arguing that these omissions require a new trial, 
Menzies relies on State v. Taylor.41 As discussed above, in 
Taylor we ordered a new trial because omissions in the voir 
dire portion of the transcript rendered the record inadequate 
for appeal.42 In reaching this conclusion, we noted that 
the omissions were extensive, the answers in the record 
indicated that jurors harbored prejudice, and the omissions 
occurred in portions of the transcript that directly reload 
to issues on appeal.43 in the instant case, only one 
question asked of two jurors was omitted, other questions 
cover the same basic information,44 and the question 
38. A representative example of such a discrepancy is the 
following: The original transcript reads, "MY WIFE'S NAME IS 
DOREEN. SHE IS AN ACCOUNTING CLERK WITH EVERETT MEDICAL 
CENTER," while the court reporter's notes read "University 
Medical Center." 
39. See supra note 34. 
40. The transcription of Spencer Morgan's and Jack Wall's 
voir dire does not contain question nine, "UNDER WHAT 
CIRCUMSTANCE DO YOU FEEL PUTTING SOMEONE TO DEATH IS 
WARRANTED?" Menzies claims that the attorneys, in argument 
concerning cause, referred to questions that are not found in 
the transcript. However, his cites do not support this 
contention. 
41. 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983). 
42. Id. at 447. 
43. Id^ _ at 445-47. 
44. Some examples of similar questions are the following: 
(Continued on page 17.) 
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concerns capital punishment and is therefore not directly at 
issue in the case. Given these circumstances, these omissions 
are not prejudicial, and the instant case is clearly 
distinguishable from Taylor. 
Although not cited by Menzies, the following 
omission in the general voir dire is also worth notice: 
THE COURT: HAVE YOU OR MEMBERS OF YOUR 
FAMILY OR CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDS EVER BEEN 
A VICTIM OF A CRIME OF A SIMILAR NATURE AS 
THOSE WHICH ARE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE? . . . 
THE COURT: DON JACKSON. WOULD THE FACT 
THAT YOUR NEXT-DOOR NEIGHBOR OR THAT POLICE 
OFFICER WAS KILLED PREVENT YOU FROM SITTING 
IN ON THIS CASE AND TRYING THIS CASE ON ITS 
MERITS? 
A JUROR: LAST WEEK I WAS ROBBED IN MY 
BUSINESS. 
THE COURT: DO YOU FEEL YOU CAN LISTEN TO 
THE EVIDENCE AND THE EVIDENCE ALONE TO 
REACH A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL VERDICT? 
A JUROR: PROBABLY. 
THE COURT: OKAY. ANYONE ELSE? 
It is clear from this colloquy that there is a gap in the 
transcript. 
Don Jackson was dismissed for cause due to poor 
hearing. Therefore, the fact that portions of his responses 
(Footnote 44 continued.) 
(10) DO YOU BELIEVE THE DEATH PENALTY IS 
ORDINARILY PROPER PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIME 
OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER? 
(11) IF THE JURY SHOULD CONVICT 
MR. MENZIES OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER, WOULD 
YOU BE ABLE TO CONSIDER VOTING FOR A 
SENTENCE LESS THAN DEATH? 
(19) ARE YOU WILLING TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE 
WHICH MITIGATES IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT AND 
A LIFE SENTENCE SHOULD THIS TRIAL ENTER A 
PENALTY PHASE? 
(20) IF A PERSON WERE TO BE CONVICTED OF 
FIRST DEGREE MURDER, WHAT INFORMATION WOULD 
YOU THEN LIKE TO KNOW BEFORE MAKING A 
DECISION AS TO A PENALTY? 
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are missing is of no concern, Rather, the difficulty is that 
it is not possible to tell from this portion of the transcript 
whether the gap incorporates testimony of other jurors. None-
theless, this gap is not prejudicial. 
As noted above, it is possible to identify jurors 
who were challenged for cause and not dismissed.45 In the 
arguments concerning whether these jurors should have been 
dismissed for cause, there was no mention of any concerns 
stemming from their prior experience with violent crime. It 
is clear, therefore, that Menzies did not object to any juror 
on any basis related to the missing testimony. In addition, 
when problems arose in the general voir dire, the jurors were 
questioned further on the subject in individual voir dire. 
None of the pertinent jurors were questioned concerning prior 
experience with violent crime. Thus, the record indicates 
that the pertinent jurors' testimony did not raise questions 
concerning their experience with violent crime. Furthermore, 
although there were no other questions dealing directly with 
past experience with violent crime, several other questions 
dealt with the presumption of innocence and prospective 
jurors' prejudice against criminal defendants.4^ Given 
these facts, this omission i;s distinguishable from the 
omissions in Taylor and does not prejudice Menzies' case on 
appeal.47 
45. See supra section III.B.l. 
46. During the general voir dire, the jurors were repeatedly 
asked if they could "LISTEN TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE EVIDENCE 
ALONE AND REACH A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL VERDICT." In addition, 
in the individual voir dire, the jurors were asked if "THE 
FACT THAT QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE DEATH PENALTY HAVE BEEN 
ASKED RAISE DOUBTS IN YOUR MIND AS TO THE INNOCENCE OR GUILT 
OF MR. MENZIES." 
47. Omissions present different problems of determining 
prejudice than other transcript errors. Often, it is not 
possible to tell how much testimony is missing, and therefore, 
it is not possible to determine if an appealable issue arose 
in the unrecorded portion of the proceeding. In dealing with 
the prejudicial effect of transcript omissions in noncapital 
cases, courts have focused on whether the omission impacted 
issues that had been preserved at the trial level and raised 
on appeal. See Taylor, 664 P.2d at 445; Seldon R. Shapiro, 
Annotation, Court Reporting—Omissions, 12 A.L.R. Fed. 584, 
586 (1987). Such an approach may not be appropriate in 
capital cases, where we often review errors raised for the 
first time on appeal. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1026 
(Utah 1989). In addition, we have "the sua sponte prerogative 
. . . to notice, consider, and correct [plain] error which is 
not . . . assigned on appeal, but is palpably apparent on the 
face of the record." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 552-53 
(Utah 1987) (footnote omitted). 
(Continued on page 19.) 
No. 880161 18 
The record is adequate to provide Menzies with a 
full and fair review of any claim relating to jury selection, 
2. Britton Issue 
Menzies claims that he is prejudiced by the numerous 
transcript errors in portions of the record relating to the 
admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of Walter 
Britton. Britton was imprisoned in the Salt Lake County jail 
at the same time as Menzies. At Menzies* preliminary hearing, 
Britton testified that Menzies had confessed to the murder. 
However, Britton refused to testify at trial on the ground 
that he feared reprisals from other inmates. The trial court 
ruled that Britton was unavailable under Utah Rule of Evidence 
804, and his preliminary hearing testimony was read to the 
jury. In his docketing statement, Menzies asserts that he was 
denied his right of confrontation due to the fact that he was 
not able to cross-examine Britton on information learned 
subsequent to the preliminary hearing and the fact that a 
subpoena served on the State's counsel was quashed. Menzies 
also claims that the trial court erred in ruling that Britton 
was unavailable. 
The factual basis for these claims is provided 
through the testimony of Mr. Savage, Britton's attorney. 
Savage testified at a pretrial hearing and during trial. His 
testimony concerned Britton's competence and a rule 35 hearing 
in federal court. In the rule 35 hearing, it was argued that 
because Britton cooperated in the State's case against 
Menzies, his federal sentence should be reviewed. One of the 
(Footnote 47 continued.) 
There is always a slight possibility that plain error 
occurred in a portion of the missing transcript. However, 
this court has never ordered a new trial based on the mere 
possibility that absent an error, a different result could 
have occurred. Rather, we will reverse if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of 
the proceedings, State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 
1989), or when the error affects a federal constitutional 
right, if there is a reasonable doubt that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceeding, State v. Tuttle. 780 P.2d 1203, 
1213 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990). A 
criminal defendant in a capital case does not have a 
constitutional right to an independent review of the record 
for plain error. See Tillman, 750 P.2d at 552-53 (independent 
review of record not mandatory). Therefore, since no 
objection was made at trial on the basis of this testimony and 
this omission was not cited by Menzies in this appeal, the 
omission cannot be the basis for a new trial unless there is a 
reasonable likelihood that a manifest and palpable error 
occurred in the missing portion of the transcript. That 
standard has not been met. 
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prosecuting attorneys testified briefly in this hearing. 
During the trial, Menzies subpoenaed the prosecutor to testify 
regarding his participation in the federal hearing. The only 
other relevant testimony is the reading of the preliminary 
hearing transcript and Britton's pretrial hearing testimony 
concerning why he would not testify at trial. Menzies cites 
more than sixty errors relating to this portion of the 
transcript. Virtually all of them relate to insignificant 
grammatical or spelling problems or to mistranscriptions where 
the actual sense of the testimony is obvious. None of the 
cited errors prejudice Menzies' ability to pursue his claims 
on appeal. Nor is there any error significant enough to 
interfere with an independent review of the trial court's 
decision. 
(a) Testimony. 
In the relevant testimony, there are instances of 
discrepancies between the court reporter's notes and the 
original transcript48 and instances of inarticulate 
statements.49 However, these errors are reconcilable when 
read in context and/or have no relevance to appellate issues. 
Nevertheless, Menzies points to this portion of the transcript 
to illustrate his claim that the transcript prejudices his 
ability to appeal. Specifically, he claims that confusion in 
the transcript concerning whether Savage first discussed a 
rule 35 hearing with prosecutors before or after Menzies' 
preliminary hearing prejudices his ability to raise issues 
48. The following occurred during the hearing testimony of 
Britton: "Q. YOU HAVE MAILING PRIVILEGES, DON'T YOU? 
A. YES, MA'AM, I DO. Q. YOU ALSO HAVE TELEVISION [court 
reporter's notes read "telephone"] PRIVILEGES, DON'T YOU? 
A. YES, MA'AM, I DO." Although there is a discrepancy in the 
transcript, the important information, that Britton had access 
to news reports concerning the murder, is present in the 
transcript. 
49. Britton also stated: 
NO, MA'AM, IT'S NOT. IF I MAY TAKE AND 
INTERRUPT FOR A MINUTE. I HAVE TAKEN 
PLACES ON THE RECORD THAT I WILL NOT 
TESTIFY IN THIS HEARING, AND I HAVE 
LISTENED TO BOTH OF YOU. YOU HAVE TOOK AND 
PLACED MY LIFE IN DANGER, NOT DIRECTLY 
BECAUSE OF RALPH MENZIES, BUT BECAUSE OF 
TESTIFYING IN ITSELF IN THE ENVIRONMENT I 
LIVE IN, AND I WILL NOT AND I REPEAT WILL 
NOT SAY ANYTHING MORE BECAUSE IT IS FOR MY 
OWN HEALTH. 
(Emphasis added.) Even assuming that the difficulty with this 
statement is the result of transcription errors and not the 
result of Britton's own misstatements, the essential 
information is preserved for the record. 
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regarding Britton's motive for testifying in the preliminary 
hearing.*0 
It is true that conflicting dates are given 
concerning this conversation. In a proffer of proof made to 
the court, a prosecutor claimed that if Savage testified, he 
would state that the first time he had contact with the 
prosecuting attorneys was on May 26, after the preliminary 
hearing. Savage, in fact, testified that he first had contact 
with the prosecutors on May 2, prior to the preliminary 
hearing. Read in context, this conflict is clearly not the 
result of a transcription error but rather the result of the 
attorney's confusion as to what evidence Savage would 
provide. Indeed, confusion as to whether the first discussion 
occurred before or after the preliminary hearing was one of 
the reasons the trial judge allowed Savage to testify at the 
hearing. Therefore, it is clear not only that there is no 
prejudicial error in the transcript, but also that the 
transcript supports Menzies' claim that Britton had a motive 
to testify falsely. 
(b) Argument. 
The vast majority of the errors which Menzies cites 
do not deal with testimony but rather with arguments held 
outside the presence of the jury. In fact, of the sixty cited 
errors, more than fifty deal with argument. It appears that 
the reporter had more difficulty transcribing argument, where 
the discussions were more heated.51 
Errors in transcribing arguments made outside the 
presence of the jury are of less significance than errors in 
other portions of the transcript. This is because these 
arguments are relevant to appeals only in reviewing trial 
court rulings, reviewing proffers of evidence, and determining 
what issues were raised in the trial court. In the instant 
case, Menzies does not cite any errors in the trial court's 
rulings, and there is no indication that the court's rulings 
were incorrectly transcribed. Likewise, there are no 
references to the record or other indications, other than the 
one instance discussed above, that an error occurred in the 
50. There is also some confusion concerning the date of the 
second contact between Savage and the prosecutors. Savage's 
testimony concerning the second contact was as follows: 
"Q. WHAT'S THE DATE. A. 7-3-86 [court reporter's notes read 
-7-30-86"]. Q. WAS THIS PRIOR TO THE RULE 35 HEARING? A. 
YES, JUST A FEW DAYS." Although there is confusion as to the 
exact date of this contact, it is clear that it occurred 
shortly before the rule 35 hearing and after the preliminary 
hearing. In any event, the exact date of this second contact 
has no relevance to any appellate issue. 
51. See infra note 55. 
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transcription of a proffer of evidence. All of the cited 
errors relate only to whether a particular argument concerning 
the admission of testimony was not raised at trial and 
therefore should be reviewed under a plain error standard.52 
The errors that occurred in the arguments are similar 
to the errors that occurred throughout the transcript. There 
are discrepancies between the original transcript and the 
court reporter's notes,53 instances where the attorney's 
arguments are inarticulate, 54
 an(j[ instances where there is 
confusion concerning who is speaking.55 However, because it 
52. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
53. An example occurred in arguments over whether a 
prosecuting attorney would have to testify and then be recused 
from the case. The prosecuting attorney stated: "IT'S 
RIDICULOUS. IT REALLY IS. I CAN'T USE ANY OTHER WORDS, JUST 
NOT LEGITIMATE TO SAY, 'HEY, OUGHT TO BE RECUSED [reporter's 
notes read "REDUCED"].'M It is clear from the context that 
recused is the correct term. Furthermore, the extensive 
argument on this point leaves no doubt as to what the parties' 
positions were on this subject. 
54. An example is a statement by Menzies' counsel: "SO WE 
WOULD FURTHER HAVE FIRST OF ALL INDICATED TO THE COURT THAT HE 
WAS NOT UNAVAILABLE." The meaning of this statement is clear. 
55. In one instance, the court reporter's notes did not 
identify who was speaking and the note reader inserted the 
names of the speakers. This type of problem is unusual and 
may be related to the contentious nature of the argument. 
However, read in context it is possible to tell who is 
actually speaking. In any event, understanding this specific 
exchange is not necessary to determine what issues were being 
raised: 
IN YOUR SITUATION, YOURS WAS AN 
ARGUMENTATIVE ADVOCACY ROLE OR ACTIVE ROLE 
ON BEHALF OF A PARTICULAR CLIENT WHOSE 
CREDIBILITY IS IN QUESTION. THEY ARE 
TWO—ENTIRELY DIFFERENT THINGS, RICK, AND I 
CAN CERTAINLY PROVIDE YOU WITH THE CASES 
THAT—IN WHICH COUNSEL HAVE BEEN PLACED IN 
THAT POSITION, AND YOU CAN SEE WHAT THOSE 
ARE. 
[Note reader inserts "MR. JONES:"] BUT 
THAT'S THE ENTIRE PURPOSE FOR YOUR RIGHT. 
EVERYBODY WOULD BECOME A WITNESS WHO 
INTERVIEWS ANYONE UNDER THOSE 
CIRCUMSTANCES. [Possible change of speaker 
not indicated in transcript.] THESE TWO 
SITUATIONS ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. AND 
YOUR CREDIBILITY BECOMES AT ISSUE. 
MS. WELLS: MR. JONES—[added by note 
reader]. 
(Continued on page 23.) 
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is only necessary to determine what issues were being raised, 
problems with one or two words or statements are more readily 
reconcilable than errors occurring in other portions of the 
transcript. This is particularly true in the instant case, 
where there were three separate arguments concerning the 
admission of the preliminary hearing testimony. In each 
hearing, many of the same issues were raised. Given the 
rather extensive argument, there is no difficulty in 
determining what issues were presented to the trial court. 
Menzies, however, points to a specific error in this 
portion of the transcript as illustrative of how the 
transcript prejudices his case on appeal. In a hearing held 
before trial, there was some confusion concerning what rule of 
evidence the attorneys were arguing. It appears from the 
context of the hearing that the attorneys were discussing 
rule 804(a). However, regardless of what rule was being 
argued, Menzies is not prejudiced by this confusion. The 
purpose of the hearing was to establish if Britton must be 
brought into court to determine if he would not testify. The 
court ruled in favor of Menzies. Therefore, any error in the 
transcription of this hearing does not impact Menzies' appeal. 
None of the errors relating to the admission of 
Britton's preliminary hearing testimony are prejudicial. 
3. Specific Errors 
A section of Menzies' brief is devoted to 
establishing that specific transcription errors prejudice his 
ability to raise particular claims on appeal. Specific errors 
which deal with voir dire or the admission of Britton's 
preliminary hearing testimony have been addressed above. The 
remaining errors deal with the transcription of numbers, the 
penalty phase, and the swearing in of witnesses. However, 
when these errors are viewed in the context of the testimony 
and in the context of the specific appellate issue, it is 
clear that they are not prejudicial. Indeed, this section is 
particularly illustrative of how minor transcription errors 
and discrepancies will generally have very little impact on 
appeal. 
(a) Numbers. 
Throughout the transcript, it appears that the court 
reporter had particular difficulty in transcribing numbers. 
Therefore, there is often confusion concerning addresses, 
distances, and dates. Menzies claims that these errors 
prejudice his ability to raise claims concerning the admission 
(Footnote 55 continued.) 
MR. JONES: OH, GOD, THIS IS ABSURD. 
MS. WELLS: YOUR LAUGHING IS INTERRUPTING. 
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of identification cards belonging to the victim, the identifi-
cation of Menzies as a man seen near the location where the 
victim's body was found, sufficiency of the evidence to 
convict Menzies of robbery and kidnaping, and an unspecified 
claim regarding statements Menzies made to police officers. 
Each claim will be addressed separately. 
(i) Admission of identification cards. During the 
trial, the victim's social security card, found among Menzies' 
possessions, and three other identification cards belonging to 
the victim, found at the Salt Lake County jail, were admitted 
into evidence. Menzies objected at trial to the admission of 
all the cards. However, in his docketing statement he claims 
only that the court erred in the admission of the social 
security card on the ground that it contained inadmissible 
hearsay. In this appeal, he claims that discrepancies 
concerning dates and a stipulation prejudice his ability to 
pursue claims concerning the admission of these cards. 
At the time of the murder and prior to his arrest, 
Menzies was living with Nicole Arnold. After Menzies' arrest 
but before trial, Arnold met and married Rodney Duffy. When 
Duffy was moving Arnold's possessions into his house, he found 
the victim's social security card. He took the card to 
Arnold's mother, Janet Franks, who phoned the police. The 
police arrived and took possession of the card. This all 
occurred on the same day the card was found. 
At trial, the State called the victim's husband, 
who identified the social security card, Duffy, Franks, and 
the police officer who took possession of the card. In 
cross-examination of Franks, Menzies emphasized that Franks 
was confused as to the year she received the social security 
card. The discrepancy which Menzies claims prejudices his 
appeal occurred during this questioning. 
Menzies' counsel asked, "WAS THE CARD GIVEN TO YOU 
SOMETIME IN 1986 [court reporter's notes read "1987"], BEING 
SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, OR WAS IT GIVEN TO YOU IN 1987 [court 
reporter's notes read "1986"], UP TO A YEAR AND SOME MONTHS 
AGO?" This line of questioning continued until Franks stated 
that she had no idea what year she received the social 
security card. 
This discrepancy is not prejudicial. The context 
of the sentence itself establishes the correct dates. The 
transcript clearly contains the information the question was 
designed to elicit—that the witness did not remember what 
year she received the social security card. The police 
officer who took custody of the card testified that he 
received the card in 1986. Furthermore, the error does not 
relate to Menzies' claim that the card contains inadmissible 
hearsay. 
No. 880161 24 
The discrepancy relating to the admission of the 
other identification cards is similarly insignificant. During 
Menzies' booking process, he suddenly broke away from the 
jailers and ran into a dressing room. He was alone in the 
dressing room for several seconds. Later that day, a jail 
employee, Jay Smith, found three identification cards 
belonging to the victim in a hamper in the dressing room. Not 
realizing the significance of the cards, Smith placed them in 
a drawer in the room. A few days later, a jailer, Officer 
Valdez, recovered the cards. 
At trial, the State called the jailers who booked 
Menzies into jail, Smith, and Valdez. Menzies' attorney asked 
Valdez how he was sure he found the cards after February 24, 
the date Menzies was booked into jail. Valdez testified that 
he could refer to his work schedule, particularly the type of 
duties which he performed, to help him remember the approximate 
date on which he recovered the cards. The discrepancy which 
Menzies claims prejudices his appeal occurred in the follow-up 
questions: MQ. DID YOU WORK ON THE 26TH [court reporter's 
notes read "22nd"] OF FEBRUARY? A. NO, MA'AM." Menzies 
claims that this discrepancy makes it impossible to determine 
if Valdez discovered the cards before or after Menzies was 
booked. 
However, given Valdez's testimony that he 
remembered the approximate date on which he found the cards by 
recalling the type of duties he performed that day, the exact 
dates on which Valdez did not work are not highly relevant. 
The transcript clearly establishes that Valdez testified that 
he found the card after the 24th. Smith testified that he 
found the card on the 24th. Furthermore, Menzies did not ask 
the trial judge not to admit the cards because Valdez found 
them before Menzies was booked. Nor was any such argument 
made to the jury. Finally, even assuming that a transcription 
error prejudices Menzies' ability to raise claims concerning 
the admission of the cards found at the jail, this should not 
result in a new trial. Given the strong evidence of guilt and 
the admission of the victim's other identification cards, any 
error in the admission of these cards would be harmless. 
Menzies claims that a discrepancy in a stipulation 
as to how long the booking process lasted is prejudicial. He 
contends that a shorter booking process would establish that 
he did not have time to hide the cards in the hamper. 
However, no such argument was ever raised at trial. The 
testimony of several jailers established that Menzies was 
alone in the dressing room for a few seconds. The length of 
the booking process does not impact on the length of time 
Menzies was alone in the dressing room. In any event, it is 
clear from the transcript that the stipulation in question 
does not purport to establish what time the booking process 
was completed. 
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(ii) Identification of Menzies. Tim Larabee was at 
Storm Mountain, where the victim's body was found, during the 
time the victim was missing and before her body was 
discovered. He testified that he twice saw a man and a woman 
walking together, heard a scream, and then saw the man leave 
alone. At trial, Larabee identified the man as Menzies. 
In the transcript, there is a discrepancy concerning 
whether Larabee first saw the man and the woman from a 
distance of twenty or fifty yards. However, this discrepancy 
is easily reconcilable. When asked the same question on 
cross-examination, Larabee stated that the distance was fifty 
yards. In any event, the distance from which Larabee first 
viewed the man is not particularly relevant. Larabee did not 
see the man's face until he saw the man for the third time. 
There is also a discrepancy concerning the date on 
which a composite drawing was prepared from Larabee's 
description. This discrepancy, however, is resolved by 
comparing the testimony of Larabee and the police officer who 
prepared the drawing. No motion was ever made to suppress the 
identification, and no claim concerning the identification was 
presented in Menzies' docketing statement. 
(iii) Insufficient evidence of kidnaping and 
robbery. At trial and in his docketing statement, Menzies 
maintains that there was insufficient evidence to convict him 
of kidnaping and robbery, the convictions used to elevate the 
homicide to first degree murder. Menzies claims that a 
discrepancy concerning the amount of money taken from the gas 
station prejudices this claim. However, the discrepancy did 
not occur in the testimony but rather in the State's closing 
argument. The prosecutor stated, "THAT FINAL AUDIT DETERMINED 
THAT THERE WAS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN $115 [court reporter's notes 
read "$114"] AND $116 MISSING. . . . AND IT WAS CERTAINLY A 
FIGURE REMARKABLY CLOSE TO THE $115 WHICH MR. DENTER TESTIFIED 
TO WHEN HE SAID HE REMOVED THAT AMOUNT CONCEALED IN AN 
UMBRELLA AT THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE." Because this 
discrepancy does not concern evidence but rather the 
prosecutor's closing argument and because there was confusion 
in the evidence concerning the exact amount of money at issue, 
this discrepancy is not prejudicial. 
(iv) Menzies' statement to the police. The State 
called Officer Thompson, who testified about an interview he 
had with Menzies concerning Menzies' whereabouts the night the 
victim disappeared. Thompson testified that Menzies told him 
that on the night in question, he picked up a woman who was 
hitchhiking. Menzies and the hitchhiker drove around for a 
while and talked, and then he took the hitchhiker to his 
house. At approximately 2:30 a.m., Arnold, Menzies' 
girlfriend, phoned from a trailer park and asked Menzies to 
take her home. Menzies and the hitchhiker picked up Arnold 
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and returned to Menzies* house, where Arnold and the 
hitchhiker had a fight. Menzies and the hitchhiker left the 
house, drove around, and got stuck in the mud. The hitchhiker 
left Menzies at this point, and Menzies returned home to 
Arnold. 
Menzies claims that he is prejudiced by 
discrepancies in the date on which the interview took place, 
the location where he picked up the hitchhiker, and the 
location where the car got stuck in the mud. However, he does 
not identify what claim these discrepancies prejudice. 
Menzies did not object to the admission of this evidence.5£! 
In fact, during cross-examination, Menzies' counsel attempted 
to bolster Menzies* story. Given the fact that this evidence 
supported Menzies' case, an erroneous ruling admitting this 
evidence cannot be prejudicial. Furthermore, this evidence 
conflicts with other evidence which supports the jury's 
verdict. Therefore, an appellate court would not consider 
this evidence in ruling on an insufficient evidence 
claim.57 Thus, no transcription error in this portion of 
the transcript could possibly prejudice Menzies' appeal. 
In any event, the relevant content of this testimony 
is preserved in the transcript. The exact date on which the 
interview took place is insignificant, and from the context of 
the testimony, it is clear that the interview took place 
between February 23 and February 29. On cross-examination, it 
was established that Menzies picked up the hitchhiker at a 
location near Mark's Lounge, a club where the victim had a 
membership. The location in which Menzies claims to have been 
stuck in the mud is of no consequence. The relevant 
information—that Menzies has an explanation for the mud found 
on and in the car—is in the transcript. 
(b) penalty phase. 
Menzies asserts that transcription errors in the 
penalty phase prejudice his ability to claim that the death 
penalty was improperly imposed, a claim that Menzies raises in 
his docketing statement. However, the errors Menzies cites 
are either reconcilable or inconsequential. The transcript is 
thus sufficient for this court to review the penalty phase and 
determine if the "'sentence resulted from prejudice or 
arbitrary action or was disproportionate.'"58 
56. Menzies objected and moved for a mistrial on the ground 
that Thompson testified that the next day, Menzies went to the 
parole office. However, Menzies does not claim that 
transcription errors prejudice his ability to pursue this 
claim. 
57. See, e.g., State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 
1991) . 
58. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1026 (Utah 1989) 
(quoting State v. Pierre. 572 P.2d 1338, 1345 (Utah 1977)). 
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A discrepancy occurred in transcribing the testimony 
concerning the qualifications of a defense expert witness. 
There is confusion as to whether the witness based a pilot 
study on one or one hundred patients. It would seem clear 
that a pilot study would be based on more than one patient. 
However, even assuming the error cannot be reconciled, it is 
insignificant. The discrepancy involves only one question, 
and the questioning concerning the witness's qualification was 
extensive, covering over nine transcript pages. The record 
clearly establishes that the witness was qualified to testify 
as an expert. 
There are also discrepancies in the testimony 
concerning Menzies* I.Q. percentile. However, other portions 
of the record indicate that Menzies was functioning in the 
"average range of intellectual functioning." Testimony con-
cerning a diagnosis contained in a psychological evaluation 
Menzies underwent as a juvenile is unintelligible,, However, 
the transcript can be reconciled by referring to the evalu-
ation, which was entered into evidence. In any event, the 
important information—that Menzies' expert witness's opinion 
differs from the opinion expressed in the evaluation—is 
present in the record. 
While there are other errors in the penalty phase, 
the basic information Menzies offered at trial is present in 
the record and adequate to review his claims. 
(c) Swearing in of witnesses. 
Menzies claims that because the court reporter used 
asterisks to represent the swearing in of witnesses, it is 
impossible to tell if the witnesses were sworn.59 However, 
the use of symbols to represent redundant occurrences such as 
the swearing in of a witness is simply a method of shorthand. 
Although Menzies cites to the transcript to support his claim, 
both the transcript and the court record indicate that the 
witnesses were properly sworn. Furthermore, there was no 
claim at trial or in the docketing statement relating to the 
swearing of witnesses. 
It is evident from the record that none of the 
errors cited by Menzies as prejudicial substantially affect 
his ability to appeal his conviction or sentence. 
4. Plain Error 
Menzies also claims that he is prejudiced because the 
transcription errors prevent appellate counsel or the supreme 
59. Menzies also claims that the names of three witnesses who 
the court reporter indicated were sworn when the exclusionary 
rule was invoked are not included in the transcript. However, 
Menzies' cite does not support this contention. 
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court from adequately reviewing the record for plain error. 
Implicit in this argument is the assertion that because it is 
so difficult to determine how transcription errors affect a 
review for plain error, Menzies should not be required to 
establish which transcription error prejudices such a review. 
This assertion is without merit. 
The only added difficulty in determining whether a 
mistake in the transcript prejudices a claim of plain error, 
as opposed to an error that has been properly preserved, is 
determining what appellate issue the transcription error 
impacts. However, unless the transcript is so inarticulate 
that it is impossible to tell what evidence is being offered 
or what issue is being argued, it is always possible to 
determine what appellate claims a transcription error impacts 
by viewing the error in the context of the relevant passage. 
This is particularly true in case of plain error, where the 
error must be both harmful and obvious.60 
It is true that a record could be so severely 
affected by transcription errors that it would be impossible 
to ascertain what arguments are being made or what evidence Is 
being offered. However, a review of the entire record reveals 
no instance where it is impossible to determine what 
conceivable appellate issues are impacted by specific errors. 
Since transcription errors of such a magnitude that might 
render significant portions of the record inarticulate would 
be obvious in nature, it is clear that the condition of the 
record does not prevent review for plain error. 
Indeed, there is only one instance where due to a 
transcription error, plain error might have occurred. During 
the testimony of the medical examiner, a juror fainted. The 
transcript reads as follows: 
DR. SWEENEY, DID YOU FIND ANYTHING ELSE 
DURING YOUR INTERNAL EXAMINATION? 
THE COURT: LETS CALL A RECESS HERE. JUST 
A MOMENT. 
HAVE THEM TAKE THE JUROR OUT. ONE JUROR 
FAINTED. 
(TAKING THE JUROR OUT.) 
MR. JONES: JUDGE WITH REFERENCE TO WHICH 
EXHIBIT IS IT? IT'S THE IDENTIFICATION OF 
MAUREEN HUNSAKER. THE DEFENSE APPARENTLY 
OBJECTED ON THE GROUNDS THEY FELT THERE WAS 
MORE FOUNDATION REQUIRED . . . . 
60. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
O Q 
MS. WELLS: EXCUSE ME, JUST A MINUTE, I 
DIDN'T MEAN TO INTERRUPT, BUT THE 
DEFENDANT IS NOT HERE. . . . HE NEEDS TO 
BE PRESENT YOUR HONOR. . . . 
MR. JONES: WE CAN MAKE THE ARGUMENT, 
AGAIN. . . . I JUST THOUGHT MAYBE WE CAN 
RESOLVE THIS, SOME OF THIS STUFF. 
THE COURT: WHAT PARTICULARLY HAPPENED 
DURING THE JURORS—DURING THE COURSE OF 
THE TRIAL. RICK WOULD BE A LITTLE MORE 
SUBTLE OR SOPHISTICATED. 
WE WILL RECESS UNTIL 2:00 P.M. 
(RECESS UNTIL 2:00 P.M.) 
After the recess, the juror who fainted was brought 
into court and explained that she fainted due to the nature 
of the testimony and the fact that she had not eaten. She 
also stated that she had eaten lunch, remembered the medical 
examiner's testimony, and was able to continue. 
It is clear that an omission occurred in this 
portion of the transcript. It is also clear that some 
discussion was held at this point. Nonetheless, any 
prejudice Menzies suffers because of this error can be cured. 
All of the medical examiner's testimony is present 
in the record. Also, the court's discussion with the juror 
who fainted is properly recorded.61 Therefore, the error 
only impacts a discussion held outside the presence of the 
jury. Although the court's statement is unintelligible, the 
statements of the prosecutor indicate that no ruling was made 
and the issues discussed were reargued later in the proceed-
ings. Therefore, it would appear that Menzies suffered no 
prejudice -from this omission. Indeed, there is no conten-
tion that anything of significance occurred at this point in 
the proceedings. 
In any event, it is possible to cure the fact that 
some of the arguments are missing without ordering a new 
trial. All that is necessary to insure that Menzies in not 
prejudiced by this omission is to review any claim that could 
have conceivably been raised at this point as though it had 
been properly preserved.62 
61. The record is sufficient to review any claim concerning 
the effect one juror's fainting had on the other members of 
the jury. See supra section III.B.1(b)(i) (relating to the 
omission of admonitions). 
62. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
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Given the fact that no prejudicial transcription 
error has been identified, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in ruling that the transcript was adequate for an 
appeal. The record is sufficient to proceed with an appeal on 
the merits. If, in the context of discussing specific 
appellate issues, Menzies can demonstrate that a transcription 
error prejudices his case, it would be proper to grant him a 
new trial at that time. However, absent an indication that 
errors prejudice his ability to raise or identify appellate 
issues, the existence of transcription errors alone does not 
justify a new trial. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
Menzies argues that several provisions of the state 
and federal constitutions prohibit the use of either 
transcript on appeal. 
Specifically, he claims that the use of the 
transcripts interferes with his ability to appeal his death 
sentence and therefore violates his right to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment of the 
federal constitution and his right to due process of law under 
the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. It is 
true that the eighth and fourteenth amendments require states 
which impose capital punishment to develop a sentencing scheme 
that genuinely narrows the class of persons upon whom the 
death penalty can be imposed and provides a meaningful basis 
for distinguishing the cases in which an individual is 
sentenced to death.63 It is also true that in states such 
as Utah, where the fact finder weighs aggravating and 
mitigating factors in the decision to impose the death 
penalty, a ''meaningful appellate review" of the penalty phase 
has been held to be an essential component of the sentencing 
scheme.64 However, since none of the transcription errors 
prejudice Menzies* appeal, use of the transcripts does not 
deprive him of a "meaningful appellate review." Accordingly, 
use of the transcripts on appeal will not violate his rights 
under the eighth amendment or the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
In a separate argument, Menzies claims that the 
transcription errors limit his ability to appeal and therefore 
the use of the transcripts will deprive him of his right to 
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment of the federal 
constitution. Utah law affords persons sentenced to death the 
right to an appeal and the right to the use of a transcript on 
63. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); Furman v. 
Georgia. 408 U.S. 238, 293-95 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1981), cert, denied. 459 
U.S. 988 (1982). 
64. Parker v. Duaaer, 111 S. Ct. 731, 739 (1991). 
appeal,65 The right of appeal is a fundamental right. 
Therefore, Menzies has a federal constitutional right under 
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the 
use of a transcript.66 However, there is no constitutional 
right to a perfect transcript. Rather, criminal defendants 
have the right to a "record of sufficient completeness to 
permit proper consideration of [their] claims."67 As noted 
above, the transcription errors in the instant case do not 
prevent "proper consideration of [Menzies'] claims." 
Therefore, use of the transcripts does not violate equal 
protection. 
Menzies argues that the condition of the transcripts 
prevents defense counsel from adequately reviewing the record 
and therefore denies Menzies' sixth amendment right to 
assistance of counsel. It has already been determined that 
the transcription errors do not interfere with appellate 
counsel's review of the record. Therefore, this claim also 
fails. 
In addition to claims under the federal constitution, 
Menzies also argues that the use of the transcripts will 
violate numerous provisions of the state constitution. How-
ever, at no time in the proceeding has Menzies provided any 
analysis for this assertion, other than arguing that in 
certain circumstances state constitutions may provide greater 
protections to criminal defendants than the federal constitu-
tion. Therefore, these claims will not be addressed. As we 
have previously stated, "[T]he mere mention of a claim of 
error . . . is not necessarily enough, even in death cases, to 
require that we engage in a full-blown analysis of the claim. 
Unless the error is manifest on the record, not only must it 
be raised, but an argument must be briefed."68 
Menzies' final claim is based on the assertion that 
the prosecutor supplemented the record without his knowledge 
or consent. He claims that this violated several provisions 
of the federal constitution. However, the State has 
stipulated to the removal of the prosecutor's comments. 
Therefore, the ex parte supplementation of the record is 
harmless and does not constitute grounds for a new trial.69 
65. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12; Utah Code Ann, 
§ 76-3-206(2). 
66. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 
(1958); Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206, 208-10 (1951). 
67. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499 (1963). 
68. State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) 
(habeas corpus granted on other grounds in Laffertv v. Cook, 
949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
69. £e£ State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah 1989), 
cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990). 
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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. We 
therefore order Menzies to proceed with the appeal on the 
merits. As noted above, in the appeal on the merits Menzies 
may attempt to demonstrate how certain transcription errors 
prejudice his appeal. Furthermore, due to the omission which 
occurred during the medical examiner's testimony, we will 
review any claim that conceivably could have been raised at 
that point as though it was properly preserved. Other than 
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